PHIL 315/PNP 315: PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
SPRING 2009, MW 1:00PM-2:30PM, CUPPLES I
SYLLABUS

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COURSE OUTLINE
This course is an introduction to contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind. Questions to be discussed include the following: What is a mind? How does what goes on in the mind relate to what goes on in the brain and in the rest of the body? Can a mind exist in a very different kind of body (for example, a computer)? How can mental events have physical consequences? What is the relation between the sciences of the mind, such as psychology, and the fundamental sciences, such as physics? Do we have privileged access to the content of our mental states?

READINGS
There are required readings for each topic (usually the equivalent of two book chapters). These readings are all contained in Jaegwon Kim, Philosophy of Mind (Westview, 2nd edition, 2006) and David Chalmers, ed., Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings (Oxford 2002). Copies of both are available in the bookstore. In addition, there is an optional reading for each topic, which may be more challenging than the required readings. Each reading assignment is accompanied by a set of questions on Telesis (under 'topics'), which will guide our discussion. Accordingly, you should come to class with notes on each question.

REQUIREMENTS
Two class exams, 1.5 hours each, to be held on February 2 and on April 1. Furthermore, two papers, 1500 words = 5-7 pages double-spaced in length, due on March 16 and on April 29. Each grade will make up a fourth of the final grade.

UNEXCUSED ABSENCEs, LATE WORK, PLAGIARISM, PASS-FAIL, INCOMPLETES
6 unexcused absences result in the final grade F. Late work will be docked one letter grade per calendar day (weekends and holidays included). No electronic submissions will be accepted. Students suspected of plagiarism will be turned in to the Academic Integrity Officer; see http://www.wustl.edu/policies/undergraduate-academic-integrity.html for the University plagiarism policy. Students taking the course Pass-Fail must earn at least a C to receive a passing grade. Incompletes will be given only under exceptional circumstances.
SCHEDULE

1 Dualism (1/12, 1/14)
   Required: Kim Ch. 2
   Optional: Descartes in Chalmers (Chs. 1 & 2)

2 Behaviorism (1/21, 1/26)
   Required: Kim Ch. 3 and Ryle in Chalmers (Ch. 5)
   Optional: Putnam in Chalmers (Ch. 7)

3 The Identity Theory (1/28, 2/2)
   Required: Kim Ch. 4
   Optional: J. Kim and R. Brandt, 'The logic of the identity theory',
   Journal of Philosophy 1967, 515-537 [JSTOR]

4 Modal objections to the identity theory (2/4, 2/9)
   Required: Kripke and Hill in Chalmers (Chs. 32 & 33)
   Optional: Maxwell in Chalmers (Ch. 34)

First exam, on topics 1-4: 2/12, Cupples I

5 Machine functionalism (2/16, 2/18)
   Required: Kim Ch. 5
   Optional: Putnam in Chalmers (Ch. 11)

6 Causal-theoretical functionalism (2/23, 2/25)
   Required: Kim Ch. 6, pp. 152-61 & 168-71; Armstrong in Chalmers (Ch. 12)
   Optional: Lewis in Chalmers (Ch. 13)

7 Objections to functionalism (3/2, 3/4)
   Required: Kim Ch. 6, pp. 161-68; Block and Nida-Rümelin in Chalmers (Chs. 14 & 15)
   Optional: S. Shoemaker, 'Absent Qualia are impossible: Reply to Block',
   Philosophical Review 1981, 581-599 [JSTOR]

First paper, on topics 5-7, due: 3/16
Spring Break: 3/9 & 3/11

8 Reduction and multiple realization (3/16, 3/18)
   Required: Fodor and Kim in Chalmers (Chs. 18 & 19)
   Optional: J. Fodor, 'The special sciences: still autonomous after all these years',
   Nous 1997, 149-63 [JSTOR]
9 Supervenience (3/23, 3/25)
Required: Horgan in Chalmers (Ch. 20)
Optional: 'How superduper does a physicalist supervenience have to be?',
Philosophical Quarterly 1999, 33-52. [JSTOR]

10 Mental causation (3/30)
Required: Kim Ch. 7 and Kim in Chalmers (Ch. 22)
Optional: F. Jackson, 'Mental Causation', Mind 1996, 377-413. [JSTOR]

Second exam, on topics 8-10: 4/1, Cupples I

11 Consciousness: the knowledge argument (4/6, 4/8)
Required: Jackson and Lewis in Chalmers (Chs. 28 & 29)
Optional: Loar in Chalmers (Ch. 30)

12 Consciousness: the explanatory gap (4/13, 4/15)
Required: Levine and McGinn in Chalmers (Chs. 35 & 38)
Optional: Block & Stalnaker in Chalmers (Ch. 37)

13 Mental content: internalism and externalism (4/20, 4/22)
Required: Kim Ch. 9 and Burge in Chalmers (Ch. 55)
Optional: McKinsey in Chalmers (Ch. 57)

Second paper, on topics 11-13, due: 4/29